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Like others, I get by with a little help from my friends.  This time I thank Gary 
Bongiovanni, James Grier, Lowell Milken, Orley Ashenfelter, Susan Athey and Bobby 
Willig for particularly helpful discussions, and Arul Karttikeya, Lauren Sun, Grace Wong 
and Brad Wynne for excellent research assistance.  I have also benefited from comments 
from seminar participants at Princeton, the OECD and Columbia.  All mistakes are my 
own.  An unwritten version of this paper was presented as the keynote speech at the 
Society of Labor Economists’ Annual Meeting in Baltimore, MD, May 4, 2002.  I would 
like to dedicate this paper to the memory of Sherwin Rosen, who was the father of the 
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Beginning in 1997, the price of concert tickets took off, and ticket sales and the number 
of concerts performed by top artists declined.  From 1996 to 2003, for example, the 
average concert price increased by 82 percent while the CPI increased by just 17 percent.  
This paper summarizes and seeks to understand trends in the concert industry from 1981 
to 2003.  Explanations that are examined include: 1) the possible crowding out of the 
secondary ticket market; 2) rising superstar effects; 3) Baumol and Bowen’s disease; 4) 
increased concentration of concert promoters; and 5) the erosion of complementarities 
between concerts and album sales because of file sharing and CD copying.  The paper 
tentatively concludes that the decline in complementarities between concerts and album 
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(609) 258-4046   There are two possible approaches one can take to delivering a keynote lunch 
speech like this one.  One approach is to present a serious paper with serious overtones, 
like one would present at a regular university seminar.  The other is to provide 
entertainment, as one is competing with lunch-time chatter and the clanging of coffee 
cups.  I will try to create a convex combination of the two: a talk on an entertaining 
subject with a serious message.  I should also mention parenthetically that this subject 
makes for a great undergraduate lecture.  Few subjects are of more intrinsic interest to 
students than popular music.  So one reason to pay attention is that you can painlessly 
teach your students some basic economics by downloading the Powerpoint slides (replete 
with music clips) from my lecture from www.irs.princeton.edu.   
Before I start I owe you an explanation.  How did I become interested in this 
topic?  The truth is that about a year ago, I accidentally fell into it.  After I wrote an 
article for the New York Times called, “Seven Lessons from Super Bowl Tickets,” I was 
invited to give the keynote speech at the Concert Industry Consortium in Hollywood, CA 
in February 2002.  I explained to the organizer that I knew very little about the economics 
of rock & roll concerts.  In fact, I explained that the only time I had gone to a concert in 
the last several years was when I took my children to see *NSYNC, and the only thing I 
learned from that experience was that I should bring ear plugs if I ever go to another 
concert!  He assured me not to worry.  His organization, Pollstar, had collected a 
database on more than 200,000 concerts dating back to 1981, and they would be happy to 
share it with me.  This naturally peaked my interest to study the economics of rock &  
  2roll, a subfield of economics I now call Rockonomics.
1   
  In case anyone believes that the music industry is only about art and has nothing 
to do with economics, consider the following quotations from two well-known Paul’s 
(quoted from Eliot, 1993, p. viii): 
 
“Somebody said to me, ‘But the Beatles were antimaterialistic.’ That’s a 
huge myth.  John and I literally used to sit down and say, ‘Now, let’s write 




“The fact of the matter is that popular music is one of the industries of the 
country.  It’s all completely tied up with capitalism.  It’s stupid to separate 
it.” 
    Paul  Simon 
 
Of course, many do think that rock & roll is more than just an industry.  For 
example, that great New Jersey native, Bruce Springsteen, once remarked, “[I]n some 
fashion, I help people hold on to their own humanity, if I'm doing my job right."  And 
undoubtedly he is correct that music can produce positive externalities.  In addition, 
many artists and their agents may have grander objectives than income maximization.  
Springsteen, for example, sets his ticket prices well below their market value.  And Tom 
Petty recently commented, “We don’t do the Golden Circle/VIP thing.  I don’t see how 
carving out the best seats and charging a lot more for them has anything to do with rock 
& roll.”
2  It is nevertheless unavoidable that fundamental economic forces – supply, 
demand, market structure, and technology – profoundly shape the music industry.   
                                                 
1 To my chagrin, the musicologist James Grier pointed out to me that Marc Eliot had already written a book 
titled, Rockonomics: The Money Behind the Music in 1989 (2
nd edition published in 1993).  Eliot’s book, 
however, is mainly about the sordid business deals in the industry, not economics.   
2 Quoted from Wild (2002).   
 
  3  As documented further below, the rock & roll industry has undergone profound 
economic changes in recent years.  After growing mildly faster than overall consumer 
price inflation – and in unison with other entertainment events – the price of concert 
tickets exploded from 1996 to 2003.  The average ticket price increased 82 percent from 
1996 to 2003, while the CPI increased 17 percent.  Moreover, the number of tickets sold, 
fraction of seats in the venue sold, and number of shows performed by star performers 
have all trended slowly downward for more than a decade.  These trends are consistent 
with the industry becoming more monopolized.  The question is, why?   
  In principle, an economic analysis of rock & roll concerts should be 
straightforward with standard tools.  Tickets should be priced to maximize profits over 
the relevant horizon, taking into account any effects on the sale of complementary goods, 
such as merchandise and record sales (see Rosen and Rosenfield, 1997).  A concert is an 
experience good, as consumers do not know the utility they would derive from a concert 
unless they go to it.  As a result, image and reputation are very important.   
Rock & roll music is also a quintessential market in which to apply the economics 
of superstars.  As shown below, concert revenue became much more skewed in the 1980s 
and 1990s.  But the economics of superstars can only take you so far in understanding 
why prices and revenues for superstar musicians have soared the last five years.  To fully 
understand the market for rock & roll stars, one needs to link Industrial Organization to 
the market.  This is the serious theme of my talk, and I would make it more general: to 
understand labor markets, Labor Economists need to be more attentive to industry 
structure, technology, product market rents, and managerial incentives.  
 
  4I.   Contractual Arrangements 
  The market for rock & roll musicians has many players and complex contracts.  
First, of course, are the musicians, who form a band.  The bands have managers who 
represent them and take a share of their earnings in exchange for their managerial 
services.  Bands make contracts with promoters to promote live concerts.  Successful 
bands also have contracts with recording companies to produce and market albums.  
Record companies could also be involved in promoting concert tours, but I have the sense 
that this is becoming increasingly unlikely, and was probably never very common.   
  Contractual arrangements between bands and promoters are heterogeneous, but 
the typical contract resembles a book contract, with an advance and royalties if sales 
exceed a certain level.  The typical contract is most easily illustrated with a hypothetical 
example.  Suppose the band Angrist’s Instruments (AI) contracts with Ron’s Promotions 
to perform a single concert.  AI receives a “guaranteed advance” – e.g., equal to the first 
$100,000 of ticket sales, and then, before additional revenue is distributed, the promoter, 
Ron, recovers his expenses and a “guaranteed profit” – say $50,000 for expenses and 
$22,500 for profit.  The expenses could include advertising, rent for the venue, costs of 
unloading the equipment, etc.  The promoter and the band then split any ticket revenue 
above the guarantee plus expenses and minimum profit (above $172,500 in this case), 
usually with the band receiving 85 percent and the promoter receiving 15 percent of these 
revenues.
3  This arrangement probably describes around three quarters of contracts.  The 
band’s guaranteed advance and percent of revenue after expenses is higher for bands with 
greater bargaining power.  
                                                 
3 These hypothetical figures were used by the head of a major management firm to illustrate to me how the 
“typical” contract is designed.    
  5In the negotiation, the band (or its manager) agrees to the concert price, which 
naturally affects the amount of revenue collected.
4  In addition, the band usually receives 
100 percent of merchandise sales (e.g., T-shirts) that take place at the concert.
5  The 
venue usually receives the beer and parking revenue.  A manager of several prominent 
bands told me that the merchandise revenue a band receives equals roughly 25 percent of 
ticket sales -- which is convenient because I only have data on ticket revenue, and I don’t 
know how the revenue is divided between the promoter and the band.  Nonetheless, if 
merchandise sales approximately equal a quarter of ticket revenue, then ticket revenue is 
approximately equal to the income the band receives from the concert.        
  In various combinations, tickets are distributed by a ticket broker (e.g., 
Ticketmaster), the venue’s box office, and, in some cases, directly by the band to its fan 
club.  
Record companies tend to sign long-term agreements with bands that specify an 
advance on royalties and a royalty rate.  The typical band has very little negotiating 
power with record labels, and the advance may not cover much more than the recording 
costs, which are often charged to the band.  Caves (2000; p. 61) comments that “casual 
evidence suggests that roughly 80 percent of albums and 85 percent of singles released 
fail to cover their costs.”  Because fixed recording costs vary little with band quality, only 
the most popular artists earn substantial revenue from album sales.    
Caves (2000) analyzes the contractual arrangements in the music industry in 
terms of the efficient division of risk, incentives and rewards.   He emphasizes that 
                                                 
4 This is apparently news to some musicians.  David Crosby, for example, told a reporter for the Dallas 
Morning News, “The ticket price isn't up to us, man.”  Quoted in Christensen (2002).  
5 Sometimes the band will be required to give a proportion (e.g., 30 percent) of the merchandise sales to the 
venue for the right to sell there, however.   
  6reputation and the prospect of repeated contracts are essential for contract enforcement.  
Eliot (1993) emphasizes that malfeasance is common in music contracts.  Caves notes 
that, “From the artist’s viewpoint, a problem of moral hazard arises because the label 
keeps the books that determine the earnings remitted to the artist.”   
An analogous problem arises with live concerts.  The following remark by Sharon 
Osbourne (2002; p. 56) underscores the difficulty of contract enforcement in the concert 
industry: “My husband’s whole career, people stole from him.  They walk off with 
thousands of dollars that’s yours.  So the only way, unfortunately, for me is to get nasty 
and to get violent.  At least you feel better.”  Caves argues that contract enforcement in 
this industry relies heavily on repeated transactions among parties who value their 
reputations.  There is also the Osbourne contract enforcement mechanism.   
 
II.  Data 
   The main source of data used in this paper is Pollstar’s Boxoffice Report 
database.  Pollstar is the trade magazine of the concert industry, broadly defined.  Since 
1981, the magazine has collected and published data on concert revenue, venue capacity, 
ticket sales and prices.  The data are provided voluntarily by venue managers to Pollstar.  
(The Boxoffice Report Form is available from www.pollstaronline.com/report.asp.) 
Venues have an incentive to report their data because Pollstar disseminates the 
information to potential clients.  Managers report data on a wide range of musical 
concerts, and occasionally on other entertainment events, such as comedians, professional 
wrestling matches and traveling Broadway shows.  The data are most complete for 
concerts, and an effort was made to exclude the non-concerts from the sample.  Before 
  7restrictions, the database contains 260,081 box office reports.  After eliminating         
non-concerts, benefit concerts, and events that occurred outside the United States, the 
sample contains 232,911 reports.
6  A report could pertain to multiple performances in the 
same venue.  Thus, the 232,911 reports encompass 270,679 separate performances.   
Reporting of concerts to Pollstar increased substantially in the 1980s, so one 
potential problem is that the dataset may not be representative of the entire concert 
industry in all years.  Major acts are more likely to be included in the dataset.  As a 
partial adjustment for changes in sample composition, in much of the analysis I restrict 
the sample to artists listed in The Rolling Stone Encyclopedia of Rock & Roll, hereafter 
called Encyclopedia bands.  This Encyclopedia contains information on 1,786 artists, and 
1,275 of these artists performed at least one concert represented in the Pollstar database.
7  
The edition of the Encyclopedia I use was published in October 2001; two earlier editions 
were published in 1984 and 1995.  Thus, the Encyclopedia contains something of a 
moving average of the leading bands in the period under study, which produces more of a 
consistent sample.  Bands listed in the Encyclopedia are responsible for 75 percent of the 
dollar value of ticket sales in the Pollstar data from 1981 to 2003.  I suspect that the 
representation of concerts in the Pollstar database is greater and more consistent over 
time for artists included in the Encyclopedia than for all bands.     
  To supplement the Pollstar database, I collected information from the 
Encyclopedia of Rock & Roll on the year each band was formed, the gender of the 
performers (male, female, mixed), the genre of music, and a novel measure of the 
“prominence” of the band – the number of millimeters written about the band in the 
                                                 
6Despite my efforts, it is possible that some of the remaining reports do not pertain to concerts.  This is not 
an issue, however, when the sample is restricted to bands listed in the Rolling Stone Encyclopedia.  
  8Encyclopedia.
8  This information was coded and then merged on to the Pollstar database, 
so another advantage of limiting the sample to Encyclopedia bands is that additional 
information is available.   
  Two other limitations of the data should be noted.  First, the ticket price and 
revenue pertain to the list price.  Any service fees charged by the ticket distributor are 
excluded.  Because service fees have been grown rapidly in recent years, this omission 
probably serves to understate the acceleration in ticket prices in recent years.  Second, I 
do not have information on secondary market, and it might be common for tickets to be 
resold in a scalper market.  Nevertheless, the list price, not the resale price, is relevant 
from the standpoint of artists and promoters, as their ticket revenue is derived from 
tickets sold at the list price.  Moreover, fragmentary evidence summarized below 
suggests that scalping is a less common phenomenon than widely believed.   
 
III.  Trends in Prices, Ticket Sales, and Revenues 
  Figure 1 displays the average price of a concert ticket (total revenue divided by 
total tickets sold each year) for all concerts from 1981 to 2003, and the (ticket-weighted) 
average high and low price of a concert ticket.  The figure also shows what the average 
price would have been had it grown in lockstep with the CPI-U.  From 1981 to 1996 
concert prices grew slightly faster than inflation: concert prices grew a compound 4.6 
percent per year while overall consumer prices grew 3.7 percent per year.  From 1996 to 
2003, concert prices grew much faster than inflation: 8.9 percent a year versus 2.3 
percent a year.  (While many economists believe that the CPI overstates the rise in cost of 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 Some of the artist were deceased or retired before the Pollstar database was started. 
8 In some cases, this information was drawn from the VH1 Encyclopedia.   
  9living because of unmeasured quality improvements, hardly any economist I know 
believes the quality of rock & roll music has improved.)  And if the sample of concerts is 
limited to those performed by bands listed in the Encyclopedia of Rock & Roll in an 
attempt to hold constant changes in composition and quality, the acceleration in concert 
prices after 1996 is slightly greater: 11.1 percent a year growth from 1996 to 2003 versus 
4.9 percent a year in the 1981-96 period.  
The cost of the highest priced ticket in the house has grown even faster than the 
average ticket (see the top dashed line in Figure 1).  Weighted by total ticket sales, the 
average high price ticket grew by 10.7 percent per annum from 1996 to 2003, while the 
average of the lowest price ticket grew by 6.7 percent a year.  Thus, price dispersion 
increased across seats for the same concert.   
  To formally check on the impact of composition effects on the average price, I 
computed a Fisher Ideal price index using the artist as the unit of observation.  The 
weights were updated each year.  The Fisher index indicated growth of 8.2 percent per 
annum in the post-1996 period, so composition changes cannot account for the observed 
rapid price growth.  
Figure 2 provides a related and more entertaining look at composition effects.  
The chart shows average concert ticket prices (total revenue divided by tickets sold) for 
10 selected artists in years in which they gave concerts.  The artists were all well 
established by the 1980s – what my students call dinosaur groups -- so there is no 
concern about increased popularity affecting their prices in the late 1990s.  With the 
exception of Garth Brooks, who makes a point of keeping his concert prices low (and 
gives relatively few concerts), all of the bands’ prices took off after the mid 1990s.  
  10Again, there is little evidence that a shift in composition is responsible for the price 
acceleration.  For the same, well-established artists, prices grew much faster than overall 
price inflation after the mid 1990s.   
Instead of the overall price inflation rate, probably a more appropriate comparison 
for concerts is the price of other live entertainment events.  Figure 3 compares concert 
prices to the CPI-U sub-index for movies, sporting events and theater.
9  To make the data 
as comparable to the CPI as possible, I computed a Laspeyres price index for concerts 
using the venue as the unit of observation.  (Unlike the CPI, however, I updated the 
weights on an annual basis.)  Price growth for these entertainment events exceeded 
overall price inflation throughout the period.  Concert price growth tracked price growth 
for the other entertainment events remarkably well from 1981 to 1996, but beginning in 
1997 the two series diverged.  From 1997 to 2003, the concert Lasypeyres index rose 64 
percent, whereas the CPI for other entertainment events increased 32 percent.  Thus, the 
gap that needs to be explained is smaller, but still substantial.   
Of course, a Princeton economist cannot address this topic with out 
acknowledging the insight of Baumol and Bowen (1966).  In some sense, musical 
concerts are a slow productivity growth sector: it probably takes the Dixie Chix at least as 
much time, effort and labor input to perform Landslide today as it took Fleetwood Mac to 
perform it in the 1970s.  As Baumol and Bowen point out, prices should rise faster than 
overall inflation in low-productivity growth sectors because of cost increases.  Baumol 
and Bowen’s disease may well account for the mildly faster price growth in live 
                                                 
9 To be precise, the BLS produces a CPI for movies, sporting events, theater and concerts.  A separate sub-
index covering just movies, sporting events and theater is not available from BLS, so I adjusted the index 
as follows.  In November and December 2001, concerts accounted for 8.4 percent of price quotes for this 
  11entertainment events than overall price inflation in the pre-1996 period.  Yet it is unlikely 
that there was a discrete jump in costs in the concert industry compared to other 
industries – let alone other entertainment industries -- after 1996.  Indeed, reductions in 
the costs of audiovisual electronics equipment probably reduced the cost of concerts.  
Nevertheless, some concert promoters do point to cost increases as a rationale for the 
acceleration in prices.  (They also have a tendency to say that they use more Mack trucks 
than anyone else.)  Unfortunately, I have not been able to track down concrete cost 
information, and it is possible that insurance costs, labor costs, pyrotechnics and other 
innovations have increased costs considerably, but I am skeptical that cost growth can 
account for much of the acceleration in the price of concert tickets after 1996.   
 
Shows, Sales and Revenues 
Figures 4a, 4b and 4c summarize trends in the number of shows performed, 
tickets sold, and revenue collected from 1981 to 2003.  The figures restrict the sample to 
artists in the Rolling Stone Encyclopedia because coverage should be more consistent for 
these artists.  If the entire universe of concerts is used, the trends are likely to be distorted 
by the rising coverage of the Pollstar database.
10   
Several trends are noteworthy.  First, the number of shows performed rose in the 
1980s, plateaued in the first half of the 1990s, and has declined by 16 percent from 1996 
to 2003.   
                                                                                                                                                 
sub-index (email correspondence from Patrick Jackman, Feb. 7, 2002).  Consequently, I netted out the 
concert component using my Laspeyres estimate of the concert CPI.    
10 As mentioned, I suspect Pollstar increased the coverage rate of small shows performed by lesser known 
performers over time.  The trend in capacity utilization for the full universe is the same as that shown in 
Figure 5, but the number of shows and tickets sold have trended upwards.   
  12Second, the number of tickets sold to concerts performed by these bands 
fluctuated around 30 million per year from the late 1980s until 2000, and has dropped 
since 2000.  In 2003, 22 million tickets were sold to concerts performed by these bands.   
Third, despite flat or falling tickets sales, total revenues (in 2003 dollars) trended 
upwards until 2000 because of price increases.  Other things equal, these trends suggest 
the elasticity of demand was less than 1.  Since 2000, however, there has been a 10 
percent drop in ticket revenue for these artists.   
Figure 5 shows the capacity utilization rate for concerts by top artists – that is, the 
fraction of available seats that are sold.  (The number of available seats varies from 
concert to concert within the same venue, and is recorded in the Pollstar Boxoffice form.)  
The fraction of tickets sold fell from around 90 percent in the late 1980s to just over 75 
percent in 2003.  In results not reported here, I find that the drop in the capacity 
utilization rate was much steeper for concerts held in larger venues.  This finding 
corresponds with the observation that large stadium tours (even Bruce Springsteen in the 
Meadowlands in 2003; see Healy, 2003) are playing to smaller crowds.   
One possible interpretation is that these artists are becoming less popular.  But 
this view is hard to reconcile with the sharp increase in ticket prices for Encyclopedia 
bands.  Instead, it seems that price growth is affecting demand for tickets.   
   
Scalper vs. List Price    
So far, we have treated the list price as the market price for attending a concert 
ticket.  If a concert is sold out and tickets are resold on a secondary market, however, 
then the price to the consumer may be very different than the list price.  The list price is 
  13still relevant to the artist because he or she does not receive revenue from the secondary 
market, but the surge in list prices may just reflect concert promoters and bands setting 
prices at a level that eliminates or reduces the secondary market.  (This begs the question 
of why artists did not set a higher price to squeeze out the secondary market all along.)  
Although I have no doubt that the secondary market is important in this industry, 
there are three reasons to suspect that a disconnect between the list price and price to 
consumers is not responsible for the major trends documented so far.   
First, the total number of tickets sold has declined.  If concerts are no more 
expensive to consumers than before, then one would not expect to see attendance fall.  
 Second, the decline in the capacity utilization rate also suggests that customers 
are finding concerts more costly.  Moreover, even in the early 1990s, most concerts did 
not sell out, so it would have been possible to avoid the higher priced secondary market. 
And prices have surged in the late 1990s even I limit the sample to concerts that sold 
fewer than 90 percent of their tickets, events where scalping would have been 
unnecessary.  
  Third, and perhaps most important, from what I can tell scalping is not as 
common a phenomenon as many industry observers believe.  One fragment of evidence 
comes from a survey of 858 fans I conducted with 12 students at Bruce Springsteen and 
the E Street Band’s concert at the First Union Center in Philadelphia on October 6, 2002, 
part of the Boss’s  “The Rising” tour.  The concert was a throwback: it was sold out and 
every ticket in the house was listed for $75, well below the market rate.  If any concert 
would have a high scalping rate, this would be it.  Yet only 20-25 percent of the tickets 
  14were bought through a scalper or ticket broker or over the Web. The average ticket that 
was resold went for around $280, yet most fans paid the list price.   
Elsewhere, I have argued that “the endowment effect” is one reason why only a 
minority of tickets is scalped (see Krueger, 2001).  But regardless of the explanation, the 
list price would seem relevant to the vast majority of concert goers.    
 
Distribution of Revenues 
As we saw, concert revenues increased in the 1980s and 1990s.  Figure 6 displays 
the share of revenue going to the top 1% and top 5% of all performers, ranked by their 
total annual concert revenue.  That is, for each band I computed the total dollar value of 
ticket sales each year relative to the U.S. total.   
Despite some blips, the figure shows that concert revenues became markedly 
more skewed in the 1980s and 1990s.  In 1981, the top 1% of artists took in 26% of 
concert revenue; in 2003 that figure more than doubled to 56%.  By contrast, the top 1% 
of income tax filers in the U.S. garnered “just”14.6% of adjusted gross income in 1998 
(see Piketty and Saez, 2003).  The top 5% of revenue generators took in 62% of concert 
revenue in 1982 and 84% in 2003.  Surely, this is a superstar market if there ever was 
one.    
Table 1 reports the revenue, number of shows performed, revenue per show, and 
average price for the top artists just before the run-up in prices (1994-95) and just after 
(2000-01).   The artists were selected by virtue of being one of the top revenue generators 
in 1996-99, with revenues in the surrounding periods as well.   
  15The number of shows performed by these superstar artists declined by 18% while 
revenue per show increased by 60%.  The increase in revenue was driven by both an 
increase in price and increase in tickets per show.   
The table also illustrates the breadth of the Pollstar data, as Luciano Pavarotti 
would not generally be considered a popular singer.  He and the other tenors are excluded 
when the sample is restricted to artists in the Rolling Stone Encyclopedia.   
 
Phenomenon to Explain   
  To recap, the data indicate that concert prices grew modestly faster than overall 
inflation until 1997.  Beginning in 1997, concert prices took off and ticket sales and the 
number of concerts by stars declined.  The evidence suggests that the price trends have 
affected the cost of concert-going, not just the size of the secondary market.  
Additionally, the share of revenue going to the top performers rose over the last two 
decades.   
These trends are inconsistent with a demand-side shift in the face of a stable 
supply curve.  The increasing skewness in the distribution of revenues, however, is 
consistent with a shift in demand toward superstar performers.     
For the economics of superstars to account for the quantity and price trends, it 
must be that: 1) superstar effects increased sharply after 1996; and 2) superstar 
performers have a backward bending supply curve that caused a decrease in concerts 
despite the increase in revenues per show.  We test the first prerequisite in the next 
section and find little support for it.  Figure 6 also suggests that the superstar model will 
  16have difficulty explaining the acceleration in prices, as the tendency toward greater 
concentration in revenues for top performers was no greater after1996.   
  Alternatively, and more likely, it seems that a discrete change in some supply-side 
factor caused concert prices to increase and a reduction in the quantity of tickets sold in 
the face of a steady expansion of superstar effects.  In short, the trends are consistent with 
the market becoming more monopolized.  Section V explores two hypotheses to explain 
why monopoly pricing may have increased in the late 1990s: concentration and 
technological change.  
 
IV. The Market for Superstars 
  The economics of superstars was proposed by Sherwin Rosen (1981), building on 
the intuition of Marshall (1947), to explain why “relatively small numbers of people earn 
enormous amounts of money and seem to dominate the fields in which they engage.”  
Rosen’s formulation of superstar markets specifies performers as imperfect substitutes 
and assumes that technology enables the best performers to reach a wide audience with 
little decay in quality.  Under these circumstances, small differences in talent at the top of 
the distribution will translate into large differences in revenue.   
Rosen concludes his article by commenting on Alfred Marshall’s explanation for 
why Elizabeth Billington, a gifted opera singer at the start of the 19
th Century, was paid 
less than a superstar salary.  Marshall reasoned: “But so long as the number of persons 
who can be reached by a human voice is strictly limited, it is not very likely that any 
singer will make an advance on the £10,000 said to have been earned in a season by Mrs. 
Billings at the beginning of the last century ....”  Rosen shrewdly observed, “Even 
  17adjusted for 1981 prices, Mrs. Billington must be a pale shadow beside Pavarotti.  
Imagine her income had radio and phonograph records existed in 1801!  What changes in 
the future will be wrought by cable, video cassettes, and home computers?”  
And what about by the Discman, internet, broadband, Napster, CD’s, DVD’s, 
MTV, flat screen TVs, iPod’s, and MP3 players?  One explanation for the increase in 
concert prices and revenue concentration, anticipated by Rosen, is that technological 
change led to increased superstar effects.  Because of technological improvements and 
rapid price declines in consumer electronics, for example, superstar performers are 
known to a larger audience.  In addition, anyone who has gone to a concert in the last 
couple of decades can attest to improvements in amplification, so singers are hardly 
limited by the reach of the unaided human voice.   
 
Evidence 
  An objective measure of star quality for popular musicians is hard to define and 
even harder to quantify.  In one attempt, Hamlen (1991) measures voice quality by a 
physical concept: the high frequency harmonic content that singers use when they croon 
the word “love” in one of their songs.  Clearly, this misses many dimensions of star 
quality.  Nonetheless, he finds that harmonic content is related to the value of record sales 
for a sample of 107 singers, with an elasticity of 0.14.  Hamlen interprets the low 
elasticity as a rejection of the Marshall-Rosen model, although it is unclear whether the 
scaling of units of quality is appropriate (a different scaling could produce an elasticity 
  18above 1) and consideration of other dimensions of star quality could possibly rescue the 
theory.
11    
Here I take a different tact.  Star quality is measured by the number of millimeters 
of print columns (including photos) devoted to each artist in The Rolling Stone 
Encyclopedia of Rock & Roll.  Although millimeters of print is a subjective measure of 
star quality, it has the virtue of reflecting the importance that the editors of the 
Encyclopedia implicitly attached to each artist.  If nothing else, it is correlated with the 
band’s prominence.  To be clear, I should emphasize that star quality is measured at a 
single point in time and I am looking for a change in the return to that measure of quality, 
due to technological changes like the ones Sherwin Rosen conjectured about.  The 
question I ask is whether a discrete increase in the return to star quality in the late 1990s 
can account for the growth in concert prices and revenues.   
For the bands included in the Encyclopedia in the Pollstar sample, the mean and 
standard deviation of millimeters of print are 268 and 199, respectively.  The least-
written- about artist was Classics IV (52 mm) and the highest was The Rolling Stones 
(1579 mm).  The 25
th percentile group (The Weather Girls) had 201 mm. of ink, and the 
75
th percentile (Beck or Lyle Lovett) had 378.   
 The  Pollstar data were aggregated to the artist/year level.  Specifically, for each 
artist (i) in each year (t), I computed the (ticket-weighted) average price, total revenue, 
and revenue per show.  These are the dependent variables in my analysis (in logarithms).  
I work with two samples: all artists and the subset listed in The Rolling Stone 
Encyclopedia.  Artists that were not listed in the Encyclopedia are assigned 0 millimeters 
                                                 
11 In case you are interested, the top four singers in his sample in terms of harmonic frequency are: Barbara 
Streisand, Bing Crosby, Frank Sinatra, and George B. Shea, in that order.  Whitney Houston ranked 18
th.  
  19of print, which is technically correct (because that is how much ink they were given) but 
perhaps arbitrary.  For the sample of Encyclopedia bands, I present results with and 
without covariates; only a limited set of covariates are available for the full set of bands.   
  The regression model is as follows: 
(1)   ln  Yit =   " + $pSi + x'it( +  *t + ,it,  
where  ln Yit  is the log average price (or log revenue or log revenue per show), Si  is the 
measure of Star Quality, x'it is a vector of covariates (number of supporting acts, years of 
experience of the band, and dummies for genre, gender and foreign status), *t is a set of 
22 unrestricted year fixed effects, and ,it is an error term.  We compute standard errors 
that are robust to correlation in artist effects across years.   
Notice that the coefficient on star quality, $, has a p subscript, indicating time 
period (1981-86, 1987-91, 1992-96, or 1997-2003).  This allows the effect of star quality 
to vary across time periods.  In the regressions, this is accomplished by interacting the 
amount of print with dummies indicating the four periods.  The test of the rising-return-
to-superstardom hypothesis amounts to a test of whether there is a discrete jump in $p 
after 1996.   
Results are presented in Table 2 for the full sample and in Table 3 for the subset 
of Encyclopedia bands.  For presentation purposes, I have scaled the millimeters by 
dividing by 1,000, so this variable should properly be interpreted as measured in meters.  
The model for prices in the first column weights the data by the number of tickets sold by 
each artist in each year, and the model for revenue per show is weighted by the number of 
shows.  The third model for annual revenue is unweighted.  The weights (or in the last 
case, lack of weights) were selected so the weighted mean of the dependent variable 
  20would correspond to the national mean, since it is the national trends we are trying to 
explain.  Unweighted estimates are qualitatively similar, however.   
First consider the results for the full sample.  All three models indicate large and 
increasing superstar effects.  For example, a 200 millimeter increase in print in the 
Encyclopedia is associated with 5% higher prices in the early 1980s, 11% higher prices in 
the early 1990s, and 15% higher prices in 1997-2003.  The effects on annual revenue and 
revenue per performance is much larger.  Although the return to star quality increased 
throughout this period, the increase was actually slower after 1996 than before.
12  For 
superstar effects to explain the acceleration in prices after 1996, it would be necessary for 
the effects to be growing at an increasing rate over time, but it is not.   
Next consider the subsample of artists represented in the Encyclopedia.  A similar 
pattern emerges for prices: the effect of star power increased throughout the period, but 
the largest jump occurred in 1992-1996, before prices took off.  And the results for 
annual revenue and revenue per show are even more contrary to the accelerating 
superstar story.  The effect of print in the Encyclopedia on these outcomes actually fell in 
the 1997-2001 period compared to the 1992-96 period.  Because revenue per 
performance should be the driving force in the superstar model, these results strongly 
suggest that accelerating returns to superstardom are not the explanation for the rapid 
price growth after 1996, although I acknowledge that my measure of star quality is 
imperfect.     
Before considering other explanations for the price trends, it is worth commenting  
                                                 
12 If I include a linear time trend interacted with millimeters of print and an interaction between a post-1996 
trend and print, instead of the period interactions with print, the same puzzle remains: the increase in the 
return to star quality is slower after 1996 then before.   
  21on the other coefficients in Table 3.  First, female performers charge a higher price and 
make more money per year or per show than male performers or than groups with both 
male and female lead performers.  Interestingly, Hamlen (1991) also found that women 
singers earn higher revenue from record sales than male singers, other things being equal.  
One possibility, however, is that the Table 3 results reflect the selection requirements for 
inclusion in the Encyclopedia, rather than a true gender difference.  To test this 
possibility, I collected data on gender for a randomly selected 217 artists who were not 
part of the Encyclopedia.  Only 7.5% of these performers were women, compared with 
14% in the Encyclopedia, and 14% were mixed gender compared with 7% in the 
Encyclopedia, providing mild evidence that the Encyclopedia did not under represent 
female artists.  In any event, price regressions for this sample indicated that female 
groups charged a statistically significant 31 percent higher price than mixed-gender 
groups, but the male-female difference was insignificant and of inconsistent sign 
depending on covariates.   
Second, the regressions reveal very little return to experience, defined as the 
length of time since the band started performing.  I do find, however, that experience is 
positively related to the gap between the high and low price charged at a concert.  
Apparently, older bands are more likely to price discriminate, perhaps because they are 
less concerned about building good will for the future or because they have a more 
diverse group of fans.  
Third, the number of supporting acts that appear with the headliner is only weakly 
related to the price, but strongly related to revenue.  Fourth, revenues are highest for Pop 
artists, while prices are highest for Jazz and Pop artists.   
  22  Finally, foreign bands charge a slightly higher price and make more revenue in 
the U.S. than home-grown bands.   
 
V.  Explanations: Cartelization and Bowie Theory 
A.  Cartelization  
  A popular explanation for the acceleration in concert prices is that the concert 
industry has become monopolized by Clear Channel Communications, the giant 
multimedia conglomerate.  There is an air of plausibility to this story.  After the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 relaxed constraints on radio station ownership, Clear 
Channel acquired nearly 1,200 stations. It also owns amphitheaters, billboards and TV 
stations. Clear Channel entered the concert promotion business in a major way by 
acquiring SFX Entertainment in 2000, and, as shown in Figure 7, the share of concert 
revenue that it promotes rose dramatically from 1999 to 2001 and then fell sharply in 
2002 and 2003.  Despite the recent dip, concentration in the industry has risen at the 
national level (see the four-firm concentration ratio in Figure 7).   
Many critics have accused Clear Channel of using its vertical and horizontal 
concentration to monopolize the concert industry.  Congressman Howard L. Berman, for 
example, has urged the Justice Department to investigate whether "Clear Channel has 
'punished' recording artists, including Britney Spears, for their refusal to use its concert 
promotion service, Clear Channel Entertainment, by 'burying' radio ads for their concerts 
and by refusing to play their songs on its radio stations."  The on-line magazine Slate 
declared, “Clear Channel is an illegal monopoly”(see Boehlert, 2001).    
  23Although anecdotal evidence abounds -- and the rising prices and declining ticket 
sales documented in Section III are certainly consistent with the exercise of greater 
monopoly power after the mid 1990s – I have found it surprisingly difficult to find clear 
evidence linking Clear Channel to the exorbitant growth in concert prices.   
For starters, I assembled data from Arbitron on FM radio audiences by station 
ownership for 98 major cities in 2002.  Clear Channel’s “radio share” was calculated by 
summing the percentage of their listeners over the stations they owned in each market 
reached by the stations.  Clear Channel’s radio listening share, which ranged from 0 to 42 
percent across these markets and averaged 20%, was then related to the share of ticket 
revenue for concerts promoted by Clear Channel in those markets in 2000 and 2001.  The 
unweighted correlation between Clear Channel’s concert share and radio share across the 
98 markets was essentially zero (r=.01).  When the data were weighted by the size of the 
population in each market, the correlation was positive (r=.08) but statistically 
insignificant.  The correlation was on the margin of statistical significance (t-ratio=1.72) 
and positive (r =.17) when the data were weighted by the number of concerts held in each 
market, but if we restrict the sample to concerts in venues with a capacity of at least 
2,000 seats – because smaller concerts are unlikely to be promoted on the radio – we find 
a weak and insignificant (weighted) correlation between Clear Channel’s radio share and 
concert promotion share.   
I also tried aggregating the data to the state level.  Again, the correlations were 
weak and insignificant.  Even when I weighted the state data by the number of concerts 
performed in the state, the correlation was insignificant and low (r=.11).   
  24Next I examined the relationship between concentration and the growth of ticket 
prices.  At either the city or state level, Clear Channel’s share of concert promotion 
dollars was insignificantly or negatively related to the growth in prices.  Likewise, I 
found no correlation between the change in the concentration of concert promoters in an 
area from 1994 to 2001 and the corresponding growth of prices or ticket sales.  
It is possible that Clear Channel uses its muscle to sign up concerts for national or 
international tours, obscuring the city- and state-level correlations, but one would have 
expected the regional data to leave some trace of Clear Channel's influence if it was the 
main force behind accelerating prices.  
Three further pieces of evidence cast doubt on the importance of the increased 
concentration of concert promotion in the U.S.  First, ticket prices have also risen sharply 
in Canada and Europe since the mid-1990's, suggesting that deregulation of radio in the 
United States is not driving the trend, although it is possible that prices are arbitraged 
across markets and the U.S. is a big market.  
Second, concert promotion has not yielded supernormal profits for Clear Channel, 
and has often resulted in losses (see Pollstar, 2002). The company blames artists for 
demanding higher fees, which it says cause higher ticket prices. Although paying higher 
fees may reflect predatory behavior intended to drive out competitors, it is nonetheless 
surprising that Clear Channel has not managed to profit from promoting concerts in areas 
where it dominates the radio market.  Moreover, the fact that Clear Channel cut back its 
concert promotions in 2002 and 2003 suggests it was not a very profitable enterprise.   
Third, concert promotion has always been a highly concentrated business at the 
city level, which might be most relevant for exercising monopoly power because most 
  25audience members are unlikely to travel very far to attend a concert.  The regional 
concentration is borne out in Figure 8, which shows the average four-firm concentration 
ratio in the largest 24 cities.  The four-firm concentration ratio within cities has hovered 
around 90% for two decades.  The average Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for 
promoters actually fell from a lofty 4,200 in 1986 to a still high but less lofty value of 
2,800 in 2001.  (An industry with an HHI above 1,800 is considered highly concentrated 
according to the Justice Department Merger Guidelines.)  Thus, the industry has gone 
from having regional monopolies to having a large national firm, but within cities 
competition could possibly have increased.   
  Although I was initially inclined to believe that Clear Channel’s horizontal and 
vertical concentration was a major reason for the hike in concert prices, after reviewing 
more evidence I have become skeptical of that position.   
 
B. Bowie Theory 
My final hypothesis, and the one I consider most promising at the moment, is that 
concert prices have soared because recording artists have seen a large decline in their 
income from record sales, a complementary product to concerts.  Many observers have 
argued that record sales are down because many potential customers frequently download 
music free from the Web or copy CD’s, either legally or illegally.  Millions of people 
have downloaded music from Napster, Morpheus and KaZaA -- and probably bought 
fewer records as a result.  Album sales slumped from 1999 to 2002, and were flat for 5 
years before then, putting downward pressure on artists' royalties.
13   
                                                 
13 See Weinraub (2002).   
  26Each band has some monopoly power because of its unique sound and style.  So 
my hypothesis is that, in the past, when greater concert attendance translated into greater 
artists’ record sales, artists had an incentive to price their tickets below the profit-
maximizing price for concerts alone.  New technology that allows many potential 
customers to obtain recorded music without purchasing a record has severed the link 
between the two products.  As a result, concerts are being priced more like single-market 
monopoly products.
14  Moreover, only the very best artists received royalties anyway, so 
this phenomenon can explain why dispersion has increased.   
Formally, the problem is one of a firm with two complementary outputs, concert 
seats and record albums, denoted good 1 and good 2, and monopoly power in both 
markets (see Tirole, 1988 or Rosen and Rosenfield, 1997).  Because of the 
complementarities, we represent the band’s demand curve for each product, D1(p1,p2) and 
D2(p1,p2), as depending on both prices.  Costs are independent of each other and depend 
only on the quantity of each specific good produced, C1(D1) and C2(D2).  The firm 
maximizes profit by selecting both prices, p1 and p2, as follows:   
         Max       p1D1(p1,p2) + p2D2(p1,p2) – C1(D1) – C2(D2) 
      {p1, p2} 
 
The proportionate markup of concert tickets over marginal cost is:  
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where the ,ij’s represent the  value of the own- or cross-price elasticities of demand.   
                                                 
14 Note, however, that there are still some other complementary products, such as shirts and souvenirs.  In 
addition, many artists care about besmirching their reputations as greedy.  Thus, prices are unlikely to rise 
to their full single-market monopoly level.   
  27  My argument is that the magnitude of the second term of the markup equation has 
declined, because an increase in concert attendance -- or popularity more generally -- has 
a much weaker effect on record sales beginning in the late 1990s.  Therefore, artists and 
their managers do not need to feel as constrained when they set concert prices.   
This model was anticipated by the rock & roll singer David Bowie, who predicted 
that, "Music itself is going to become like running water or electricity" and he advised 
performers, "You'd better be prepared for doing a lot of touring because that's really the 
only unique situation that's going to be left." (Quoted from Pareles, 2002.)  Hence, I call 
this hypothesis Bowie Theory.   
I should acknowledge that the timing for Bowie Theory is not perfect, but it is not 
terrible either.  Napster was launched in May 1999 and imitators and MP3 players 
quickly followed.  CD’s could be copied in the late 1990s, however.  Although concert 
price growth began to diverge from price growth for other entertainment events in 1997, 
the biggest jump was in 1999.   
There is also some fragmentary empirical support for the hypothesis.  Relative to 
album sales, Jazz fans are much less likely to download music from the Web than are 
fans of rock and pop (see Oberholzer and Strumpf, 2004).  From 1996 to 2003, concert 
prices increased by only 20 percent for jazz, but by 99 percent for rock and pop.  The 
declining complementarities argument can also account for the price growth in Canada 
and Europe.  On the other hand, I have to admit that the direct evidence for filing sharing 
crowding out record sales is more mixed than I anticipated (see Liebowitz, 2003 and 
Oberholzer and Strumpf, 2004).     
  28VI.  Conclusion 
  Concert revenues for top rock & roll performers, along with ticket prices, took off 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  The economics of superstars can help explain the 
longer-term trends in the industry, but not the recent surge in prices and revenues.  My 
leading hypothesis for these developments is Bowie theory: a technology-induced erosion 
of the complementarity between record sales and concert tickets.  Even if Bowie theory is 
premature, it is likely that downloading of music will put upward pressure on concert 
prices and revenue in the near future.   
  In addition, interests of performers apart from income maximization play a role in 
the economics of the rock & roll industry.  By my calculation, Bruce Springsteen gave 
away $3 million of producer surplus to his fans in Philadelphia by setting his (uniform) 
ticket price below the market price.  This figure is double the ticket revenue the concert 
actually took in!  A similar point was made by Tom Petty:    
My top price is about sixty-five dollars, and I turn a very healthy profit on 
that; I make millions on the road.  I see no reason to bring the price up, 
even though I have heard many an anxious promoter say, ‘We could 
charge 150 bucks for this.’  I would like to do this again and maybe come 
through and not leave a bad taste in people’s mouths.  … It’s so wrong to 
say, ‘OK, we’ve got them on the ticket and we’ve got them on the beer 
and we’ve got on everything else, let’s get them on the damn parking.’ 
You got to care about the person you’re dealing with.  (Quoted from Wild, 
2002.  Italics added.) 
 
   
Some artists care about their customers’ well being as well as their own income.  
It is hard to rule out the possibility that concert tickets were under priced in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, perhaps because of “fairness” considerations.  Nevertheless, the market still 
responds to economic forces.  It is telling that both Bruce Springsteen and Tom Petty 
have more than doubled their ticket prices since the early 1990s.  Super Bowl ticket 
  29prices, which are undoubtedly grossly under priced, have increased much faster than 
concert prices the last 25 years.  For experience goods, prices may be kept below their 
market-clearing level because the price is part of the experience, especially if performers 
are trying to build a long-term audience.  Eventually, however, it seems that the prices of 
experience goods approach their market clearing level, perhaps because fans come to 
divorce the price from the experience.   
This foray into the concert industry labor market highlighted the importance of 
Industrial Organization because of industry concentration, complementary products and 
rent sharing.  I would argue that in labor markets more generally, it is in the interest of 
Labor Economists to explore the links between Industrial Organization and Labor 
Economics more thoroughly.  Rent sharing probably accounts for a large share of the 
industry wage differentials that arise for similar workers (Dickens and Katz, 1987; 
Krueger and Summers, 1987); market concentration affects the hiring of female 
employees within industry (Ashenfelter and Hannan, 1986); deregulation has affected 
wages and employment (Peoples, 1998); technological change appears to have been a 
major reason for the rise in wage dispersion and skill differentials in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Autor, Katz and Krueger, 1998); and norms can affect the distribution of income 
(Piketty and Saez, 2003).  Our understanding of labor markets will be incomplete unless 
we better appreciate the interactions among product markets, technology and labor 
markets, and recognize how fairness considerations are moderated by market forces – in 
the rock & roll industry and elsewhere.  
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Bruce SpringsteenFigure 3: Concert Prices Tracked Movie, Theater and Sports Tickets Well Until 1997




























& SportsFigure 4a: Number of Shows Each Year















































Figure 4b: Number of Tickets Sold Each Year
































































Figure 4c: Total Ticket Revenue in 2003 Dollars
































)Figure 5: Proportion of Seats That Are Filled for Concerts held by
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Figure 6: Share of Total Ticket Revenue Accruing to Top Performers, 1982-2003
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Fig. 7: Percent of Total Revenue Handled by Biggest 4 Promoters,


























Source: Calculated by Alan Krueger based on Pollstar data.  Only concerts performed in the
U.S. are included in the analysis.  Sample consists of artists listed in The Rolling Stone Encyclopedia.
CC refers to Clear Channel Communications share.
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CC90.5%
Figure 8: Average Within-Market Percent of Revenue Handled by 































Source: Calculated by Alan Krueger based on Pollstar data.  Sample consists of artists listed 
in The Rolling Stone Encyclopedia. Figure shows average of percent in each of the top 24 cities.Table 1: Concert Revenue and Prices in 1994-95 and 2000-01 for Artists with Highest Revenue per Show in 1996-1999
1994-5 2000-1 Percent Change
Artist Total Revenue Number Rev. per show Average Total Revenue Number Rev. per show Average Total Revenue Number Rev. per show Average
(in thousands) of Shows (in thousands) Price (in thousands) of shows (in thousands) Price (in thousands) of shows (in thousands) Price
The Eagles $151,000 102 $1,480 $67.50 $4,837 1 $4,837 $89.22 -96.8% -99.0% 226.8% 32.2%
Barbra Streisand 54,200 20 2,710 201.65 27,700 4 6,925 483.61 -48.9% -80.0% 155.5% 139.8%
Reba McEntire 50,200 147 341 29.49 11,800 43 274 42.76 -76.5% -70.7% -19.6% 45.0%
Jimmy Buffett 35,700 64 558 31.39 49,600 62 800 39.84 38.9% -3.1% 43.4% 26.9%
George Strait 28,600 76 376 23.73 22,500 11 2,045 48.60 -21.3% -85.5% 443.5% 104.8%
Aerosmith 24,200 54 448 29.64 45,900 59 778 47.34 89.7% 9.3% 73.6% 59.7%
Elton John 24,200 37 654 40.66 21,800 38 574 56.70 -9.9% 2.7% -12.3% 39.4%
Phish 23,100 141 164 23.27 21,300 40 533 30.50 -7.8% -71.6% 225.0% 31.0%
Eric Clapton 21,500 40 538 42.65 32,900 40 823 62.46 53.0% 0.0% 53.0% 46.4%
Metallica 20,800 40 520 27.74 37,500 18 2,083 60.45 80.3% -55.0% 300.6% 117.9%
Rod Stewart 18,500 35 529 39.46 23,900 58 412 46.12 29.2% 65.7% -22.0% 16.9%
Janet Jackson 14,200 33 430 36.54 38,400 51 753 64.37 170.4% 54.5% 75.0% 76.1%
Dave Matthews Band 10,700 131 82 21.55 129,000 110 1,173 43.72 1105.6% -16.0% 1335.8% 102.8%
Pearl Jam 9,264 33 281 23.32 8,454 18 470 28.91 -8.7% -45.5% 67.3% 24.0%
Beastie Boys 6,196 28 221 22.99 338 2 169 50.00 -94.5% -92.9% -23.6% 117.5%
Luciano Pavarotti 5,410 4 1,352 88.19 10,300 9 1,144 105.78 90.4% 125.0% -15.4% 19.9%
Bruce Springsteen & 
The E Street Band 1,652 16 103 35.45 47,000 48 979 65.20 2745.3% 200.0% 848.4% 83.9%
Ozzy Osbourne 1,516 12 126 28.86 49,100 67 733 43.37 3139.3% 458.3% 480.2% 50.3%
Paul Simon 368 1 368 82.14 5,989 25 240 34.35 1529.4% 2400.0% -34.8% -58.2%
Mariah Carey 325 1 325 27.51 6,687 8 836 59.70 1960.5% 700.0% 157.6% 117.0%
KISS 141 1 141 11.94 60,100 118 509 50.07 42436.8% 11700.0% 260.5% 319.3%
Average $23,894 48.4 $494 $40.41 $31,196 39.5 $789 $50.02 30.6% -18.3% 59.8% 23.8%
Source: Computations based on Pollstar database.  All dollar figures converted to 2001 dollars based on CPI-U. 
 
Table 2: Price, Revenue and Revenue per Show Regressions  
         for All Artists   
 
---------------------------------------------------- 
                   Log Price   Log Annual   Log Revenue 
                               Revenue      per Show 
Variable              (1)         (2)         (3) 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Intercept           2.261*      9.493*      9.277*  
                   (0.053)     (0.121)     (0.143)   
 
Star Quality        0.234*      3.513*      2.413*  
* 1981-86          (0.058)     (0.228)     (0.175)   
 
Star Quality        0.289*      4.555*      3.090*  
* 1987-91          (0.043)     (0.220)     (0.189)   
 
Star Quality        0.523*      5.222*      3.495*  
* 1992-96          (0.065)     (0.240)     (0.240)   
 
Star Quality        0.700*      5.508*      3.571*  
* 1997-2003        (0.066)     (0.234)     (0.240)   
 
Number of           0.0003      0.094*      0.024*  
Support Acts       (0.0003)    (0.003)     (0.001)   
 
R-sq                0.518       0.366       0.359   
 




Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All  
equations include year dummies. Column 1 is estimated  
by WLS, where weights are tickets sold; Column 2 is  
estimated by OLS; and column 3 is estimated by WLS where  
weights are the number of shows performed in the year. 
 
Star Quality is millimeters of space devoted to the artist 
in the Rolling Stone Encyclopedia, divided by 1,000.   
 







Table 3: Price, Revenue and Revenue per Show Regressions for Artists Listed  
         in The Rolling Stone Encyclopedia of Rock & Roll  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Log Price  Log Annual   Log Revenue  Log Price  Log Annual  Log Revenue 
                     Revenue      per Show               Revenue     per Show 
Variable    (1)         (2)         (3)         (4)         (5)         (6) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Intercept  2.258*      9.572*      9.222*      2.241*      9.834*      9.519*  
          (0.063)     (0.181)     (0.236)     (0.070)     (0.302)     (0.279)   
 
Star Qual  0.248*      3.314*      2.592*      0.237*      3.358*      2.468*  
*1981-86  (0.068)     (0.342)     (0.327)     (0.054)     (0.361)     (0.281)   
 
Star Qual  0.264*      3.862*      2.790*      0.260*      3.889*      2.662*  
*1987-91  (0.050)     (0.358)     (0.258)     (0.041)     (0.374)     (0.272)   
 
Star Qual  0.478*      4.047*      2.822*      0.455*      4.105*      2.646*  
*1992-96  (0.077)     (0.383)     (0.325)     (0.077)     (0.393)     (0.327)   
 
Star Qual  0.632*      3.542*      2.346*      0.616*      3.637*      2.206*  
*1997+    (0.097)     (0.341)     (0.307)      (0.10)     (0.350)     (0.305)   
 
No. of     0.0002      0.084*      0.022*      0.001~      0.084*      0.022*  
Sppt Acts (0.0003)    (0.004)     (0.002)     (0.000)     (0.005)     (0.002)   
 
Male                                 0.084       0.344       0.220   
                                 (0.048)     (0.238)     (0.185)   
           
Female                             0.213*      0.627~      0.475~  
                                  (0.057)     (0.259)     (0.197)   
           
Experience                               0.003      -0.008       0.003   
                                   (0.002)     (0.005)     (0.005)   
           
Foreign                           0.065~      0.240~      0.194   
                                  (0.026)     (0.112)     (0.103)   
Genre           
 Other                            -0.307*     -0.985*     -1.178*  
                                  (0.113)     (0.255)     (0.270)   
           
 Blues                                        -0.236*     -0.955*     -1.593*  
                                  (0.054)     (0.342)     (0.437)   
           
 Country/Western                              -0.189*     -0.267      -0.289   
                                   (0.047)     (0.215)     (0.184)   
           
 Folk                              -0.222~     -1.199*     -1.298*  
                                  (0.091)     (0.251)     (0.210)   
           
 Jazz                              0.044      -0.380      -0.504   
                                  (0.083)     (0.298)     (0.294)   
           
 Rock & Roll                               -0.169*     -0.785*     -0.587*  
                                  (0.030)     (0.144)     (0.141)   
 





Table 3 – Continued  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Log Price  Log Annual   Log Revenue  Log Price  Log Annual  Log Revenue 
                     Revenue      per Show               Revenue     per Show 
Variable    (1)         (2)         (3)         (4)         (5)         (6) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 R&B                                          -0.105      -0.550*     -0.462~  
                                              (0.076)     (0.197)     (0.222)   
 
 Rap                              -0.180*     -1.155*     -0.761*  
                                  (0.041)     (0.191)     (0.182)   
           
 Reggae                           -0.320*     -0.949*     -1.278*  
                                  (0.060)     (0.271)     (0.264)   
 
R-sq          0.668       0.382       0.338    0.715       0.416       0.406  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All equations include year 
dummies. Columns 1 and 4 are estimated by WLS, where weights are tickets sold; 
Columns 2 and 5 are estimated by OLS; and columns 3 and 6 are estimated by WLS 
where weights are the number of shows performed in the year. Baseline genre 
dummy is pop music. Baseline gender is both men and women.   
 
Star Qual is millimeters of space devoted to the artist 
in the Rolling Stone Encyclopedia, divided by 1,000. 
 
Sample size is 10,043 artist/year observations.  
 
~ indicates p<0.05; * indicates p<0.01  
 
 
 
 